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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15275

-vsGAYLE LEE BOONE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with Unlawful Distribution of
a Controlled Substance for Value in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(a)

(1953), as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by a jury in the court of the
Honorable James

s.

Sawaya, Judge, in the Third Judicial

District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
On June 17, 1977, appellant was found guilty as charged and
sentenced to a term of zero to ten years in the Utah State
Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the verdict
below.
SThTEMENT OF FACTS
In

January, 1977, Detective Tom Carlson of

the Bountiful Police Department met Kayle Shaw, a former
drug user, who was incarcerated in the Salt Lake County
Jail.

Shaw informed Carlson that he wanted to be an

undercover narcotics agent (T.l7,256).

After his release

from jail, Shaw had given the narcotics agents a list of
approximately fourteen names of persons he had bought drugs
from and whom he would help prosecute through controlled
narcotics purchases (T.l28).

During the months of

Februa~

March and April, Shaw, known undercover as Mike Days, made
controlled buys from nine different persons (T.261).
One such controlled buy was arranged on April 2C,
1977, when Shaw and appellant agreed that Shaw would pay
the $1,000 price quoted by appellant for an ounce of THC
(T.27,29)

(THC is the street name for tetrahydrocanibol,

the active ingredient in marijuana).
On April 27, 1977, at about 5:00p.m., Shaw

cal~

appellant at The Gym, 2827 South 2300 East, an exercise

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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establishment frequented by appellant (T.346, 350), and asked
if appellant had the THC (T.25).

Appellant reponded that he

had it and told Shaw to come to The Gym to get it (T.25).
Shaw then telephoned Tom Carlson at the
office of the State Narcotics Law Enforcement Division at
the Utah State Fairgrounds and told him the delivery was
set (T.26).

On arrival at the Fairgrounds office, Shaw was

strip-searched, provided with $1,000 in bills which had been
xeroxed and whose numbers had been separately listed, wired
with a hidden, electronic transmitter and given a code
phrase to use to report that the buy had been made; all
standard procedures for undercover narcotics purchases (T.26,
173,175).

Detective Carlson also searched Shaw's car and

found no narcotics secreted there (T.l73).

At approximately

5:45 p.m. Shaw drove directly to The Gym, with six cars and
twelve agents following close behind (T.30,174).

On arrival

at The Gym, appellant told Shaw to take a break because "his
man" had not arrived yet (T.35).

Shaw drove to the 7-11 Store

at 3300 South 2300 East, followed by Agent Allred and Detective
Carlson (T.36,180).

Once again Shaw was patted down before

returning to the exercise club (T.26,180), where appellant
remarked that his delivery man would be driving a white
Continental.

A white Continental Mark IV arrived at 7:15;

Shaw went inside the building (T.47).

A few minutes later
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appellant entered the club and gave Shaw a plastic bag
which contained a brown powder (proven to be PCP
[phencyclidine, an animal tranquilizer))

('l'c

308),

e~fter

Shaw had counted out and given appellant (identified by
Shaw atT.28) $1,000 (T.51).

Shaw transmitted the pre-

arranged signal to show that the buy had been made (T.52),
and appellant and Shaw left the building.

Appellant got

into the passenger side of the white ContinPntal driven
by a man identified by Agent Allred as David Albo, codefendant in the trial (T.l87).

Narcotics agents swarmed

over the scene, appellant and Albo were arrested, Agent
Fullmer recovered from Albo $980.00 of the money supplied
to Shaw, and Shaw was placed under mock arrest (T.53,188,1'
288).

Agent Moore and Shaw initialed the baggie

containi~

the PCP, sealed it in a yellow packet, and Moore stored it
the evidence locker until it was dispatched to Bruce Beck'
a toxicological analysis (T.296,300-301).
ARGmlENT
POINT I
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND UTAH CODE AN:;
§§

76-9-401, 402 (SUPP. 1977), ALLO\v WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC

EAVESDROPPING WHERE THE TRANSHITTER IS ATTACHED TO A ~viLLI
INFORHANT-PARTICIPANT.
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Appellant argues that the plurality opinion of
Justice White in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 28
L.Ed.2d 453 (1971), is a misstatement and misanalysis of
the law concerning privacy and electronic eavesdropping.
He urges this Court to reject this Supreme Court interpretation of case law and constitutional standards and asks
this Court to hold that warrantless electronic monitoring
of a volunteer participant in a controlled drug purchase
violates the constitutional right of privacy and is
unreasonable search and seizure of the conversation.
Respondent submits that the White decision is correct and
logical and represents the current law in the area of
privacy and warrantless electronic searches.
In White, a case very similar to the instant
case, the trial court overruled appellant's objections to
testimony by government agents regarding conversations
between the accused and an informant which the agents
overheard by monitoring the frequency of a radio transmitter concealed on the informant.

The prosecution was

unable to locate and produce the informant at trial.
Relying on Katz v. United States, 389

u.s.

347, 19 L.Ed.2d

576 (1967), which held inadmissible recordings of
conversations made by government agents by means of a
listening device attached to the outside of a public
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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telephone booth, the Seventh Circuit Court of i>ppeals
reversed White's conviction.

On certiorari, the United

States Supreme Court reversed the Circuit decision.
In an opinion joined by Burger,Chief Justice,
Stewart, Justice, and Blackmun, Justice, Mr. ,Tustice
Whiteconfronted the issue of:
"
• whether the Fourth
Amendment bars from evidence the
testimony of governmental agents
who related certain conversations
which had occurred between defendant
White and a government informant,
Harvey Jackson, and which the agents
overheard by monitoring the frequency
of a radio transmitter and concealed
on his person." 28 L.Ed.2d at 456.
(Mr. Justice Black concurred and qujckly disposed of the
Fourth Amendment claim, citing his dissent. in Katz v. Unit'
States, 389

u.s.

at 591, wherein he stated that the framer'

of the Constitution had not intended to restrict or

outl~

use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, with wiretappin·
merely a sophisticated form of eavesdropping.)
The Court acknowledged that Katz v. United State
389 U.S. 347, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)
United States, 277

u.s.

1

overruled Olmstead v.

438, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928), and~

v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), whic
held that an actual physical trespass or invasion was

re~

before the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasona
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searches and seizures arose, therefore exempting wiretapping
and electronic eavesdropping which originated beyond the
curtilage

of a home.

Katz, supra, held inadmissible

recordings obtained from a listening device placed on the
outside of a phone booth without defendant Katz's knowledge
or consent, where the government agents had not obtained
a search warrant, thereby violating the privacy on which
Katz had justifiably relied.
The White Court distinguished and limited Katz,
noting that Katz did not involve the use of a government
informant who reported the conversation content to the
government.

Nor did the Katz Court:
"
• indicate in any way that
a defendant has a justifiable and
constitutionally protected expectation
that a person with whom he is conversing
will not then or later reveal the conversation to police." 28 L.Ed.2d 457.

Therefore, Katz with its warrant requirement is limited to
those circumstances not involving a participating informant.
Katz only applies to occasions in which the government seeks
to surreptitiously monitor phone calls and/or conversations
in private places.

Consequently, Katz is inapplicable to the

case at bar, for here the state's chief witness, who agreed
to wear a concealed transmitter, was a volunteer undercover
agent purticipating in the controlled drug buy with appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-7Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Unlike Katz, jn which the recordings were mode for the
purpose of obtaining evidence of criminal activity, the
instant case included the use of a transmitter primarily
to provide protection for Kayle Shaw, the undercover
agent (T.l71).

Should a narcotics dealer learn that the

intended purchaser is actually a narcotics agent, the
agent's life is placed in serious immediate jeopardy; a
transmitter allows supporting police officers to move in
quickly if the transmission reveals that the undercover
agent is in trouble.
Appellant alleges that ,Tustice Hhi te misconstruec
earlier cases on the informant eavesdropping or
monitoring topic,particularly Hoffa v. United
U.S. 293, 17 L.E.2d 374

electron~

Sta~es,

385

(1966); Lewis v. United States, 38'

U.S. 206, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966); and Lopez v._ United State'
373 U.S.

427, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963).

Although these pre-

Katz opinions arose in the trespass analysis era of the
United States Supreme Court, United States v. White, supra
found all three cases to be unaffected by Katz.

The Court

in Hoffa, supra, announced in clear language that the Four
Amendment offers no protection to a defendant who relies
upon a colleague's trust, only to learn that the "trusted
colleague" is a government agent who reports regularly

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the authorities.
"Neither this Court nor anv
member of it has ever expressed-the
view that the Fourth Amendment
protects a wrongdoer's misplaced
belief that a person to whom he
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing
will not reveal it." 17 L.Ed.2d at
382.
Since no electronic monitoring occurred in Hoffa, the only
question presented to the Hoffa court which has relevance
to this case was the admissibility of the informant's
testimony.

Any attempt to determine from the opinion how

the Court would have treated the admissibility of testimony
of an electronically eavesdropping government agent if such a
person had existed is unproductive speculation.
Lewis v. United States, supra, concerned the admissibility of narcotics purchased from the defendant at his
home by an undercover federal narcotics agent.

Appellant

alleged that the deception violated his Fourth Amendment
rights but the Court rejected the claim, stating:
"Were we to hold the deceptions
of the agent in this case constitutionally prohibited, we would come
near to a rule that the use of
undercover agents in any manner is
virtually unconstitutional per se.
Such a rule would, for example,
severely hamper the government in
ferreting out those organized
crininal activities that are
characterized by covert dealings
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with victims who either cannot or
do not protest. A prime example is
provided by the narcotics traffic."
17 L.Ed.2d at 316.
While neither Hoffa nor Lewis involved electronic
eavesdropping, they do support the general propositions
that (1) the enforcement of narcotics laws requires stealti
covert operations, and the participation and cooperation o'
informants or undercover agents and (2) Fourth Amendment
protections do not extend to defendants who knowingly vio1
the criminal laws and who seek acquittal solely because th'
shared incriminating information and/or engaged in crimina:
activity

with a person who was a covert government

age~

subsequently testified against them.
The third case cited by White in supporting its
holding and more nearly on point to the instant case and
to the White facts is Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427.
10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963).

In Lopez, the appellant was convic

of attempting to bribe an Internal Revenue Service agent,
the offer of the bribe had been secretly recorded by the
agent during a meeting at Lopez's office.

Appellant cla~

that the recording should not have been admitted into
evidence, but the Court rebuffed his challenge, observing
that the recording device had not been planted during a
trespass but had been carried in and out by an agent who

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was there with petitioner's assent, and that the device
neither saw nor heard more than the agent himself.

The

Court then focused on appellant's real complaint:
"Stripped to its essentials,
petitioner's argument amounts to
saying that he has a constitutional
right to rely on possible flaws in
the agent's memory, or to challenge
the agent's credibility without
being beset by corrohorating
evidence that is not susceptible
of impeachment. For no other
argument can justify excluding an
accurate version of a conversation
that the agent could testify to
from memorv. We think the risk that
petitioner- took in offering a bribe
to Davis fairly included the risk that
the offer would be accurately reproduced
in court, whether by faultless memory
or mechanical recording." 10 L.Ed.2d
at 471.
In allowing evidence of the recorded conversation
the Court in Lopez reasoned that if the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic equipment do
not violate a defendant's constitutionally justifiable
privacy expectations:
" • • • neither does a simultaneous
recording of the same conversations made
by the agent or by others from transmissions received from the agent to whom
the defendant is talking and whose
trustworthiness the defendant necessarily
risks." 28 L.E.2d at 458.
Given the antecedent case law analyzed in White, the
plurality opinion harmonized the surviving cases in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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eavesdropping area and arrived at several reasonable
conclusions, which while aiding law enforcement safeguard
constitutional rights of citizens.

These conclusions are:

(1) as the law does not protect a wrongdoer whose trusted
accomplice is a police agent, neither should it protect
him when the same agent records or transmits the
conversation, which is later offered into evidence;

(2)

having resolved any doubts about Rn accomplice being an
informant, a wrongdoer is unlikely to distinguish between
probable informers on one hand and probable informers
with transmitters on the other to the extent requiring
discrete constitutional recognition of those differences;
(3) the courts should be wary of erecting constitutional
barriers to relevant and probative evidence which is also
accurate and reliable, recognizing that a defendant who has
no right to exclude an agent's testimony ought not be allm
to exclude a more accurate version of the events;

(4) it

would be untenable to find that while the undercover agent
without a warrant has acted "reasonably," once he

straps~

a transmitter his "reasonable" activities are suddenly
transformed into an "unreasonable" investigation in viola'
of Fourth Amendment guarantees.
Respondent asserts that in the instant case a
reasonable, legal investigation and arrest occurred.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Although Kayle Shaw was wired with a transmitter for his own
protection, it was reasonable, proper and in accord with
applicable law to admit the tape recording and allow the
jurors to hear the best evidence of what actually transpired
in The Gym.
This position is fully supported by Utah law.

The

privacy section of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-401 (Supp. 1977),
provides the following definition:
"(2)
'Eavesdropping' means to
overhear, record, amplify, or transmit
any part of a wire or oral communication
of others without the consent of at
least one party thereto by means of
any electronic, mechanical, or other
device."
(Emphasis added.)
This provision certainly provides for and protects the use
of wired, undercover operatives, and as Kayle Shaw had
consented to the attachment of the transmitter to his
person, no violation of Section 76-9-402 occurred.
Finally, under Utah Code Ann.

§

77-54-1 (1953),

as amended, it is doubtful if a search warrant could have
been issued.

Warrants are limited to the seizure of personal

property and considerable imagination and judicial creativity
would have to be employed to equate the sound vibrations of
a person's voice with personal property.
As noted by appellant, Michigan is a state which
has decided that a search warrant is required in these
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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circumstances.

See People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227

N.W.2d 511 (1975), cert. den. 423

u.s.

878, 116 L.Ed.2d 111.

However, the }1ichigan search warrant statute, Mich.
Compiled Laws 780.652, is unlike the Utah statute in that
it authorizes the seizure of personal property and "other
thing(s]."

Perhaps because sound waves can be

categoriz~

as "other thing[s]" they are therefore seizable, hut no
such exception is codified in Utah.

While acknowledging

that this court has the power to provide an individual wit:
greater protection under the state constitution than he
enjoys under the federal constitution, respondent urges th:
Court not to adopt the minority Michigan view.

Instead,

this Court should uphold the admissibility of the tape~
Such a decision would acknowledge both the genuine individ
protections of the Fourth Amendment and societal protectio:
against

abandoning the Fourth Amendment to lawbreakers wh·

use it primarily to shield themselves from criminal culpa·
bility.

In United States v. White, the Court weighed and

balanced the needs of effective law enforcement against t!:·
right of an individual to be free from unreasonable seard
and seizures.

Respondent believes that the l"ihi te analysi'

correct and appellant's conviction should therefore be
affirmed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
AS VARIOUS RULINGS BY THE '.:'RIAL COUR'l' HERE IN
ACCORD IHTH LAIV, APPELLANT RECEIVED A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT A
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE
THE UNDERCOVER AGENT'S FULL VERSION OF THE EVENTS

~'7HICH

OCCURRED DURING THE PROTRACTED NARCOTICS TRANSACTION; SUSTAINING APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS AND THE GIVING OF APPROPRIATE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS CURED OTHER IMPERFECTIONS.
During the direct examination of Kayle Shaw, he
was questioned about the conversation that he had with appellant
while the two men awaited the delivery of the drugs.

Shaw

testified that appellant told him that "he still has an ounce
of Angel Dust down in his crib [apartment]."

(T.39)

Appellant

then moved for a mistrial and the trial court denied the
motion, stating that while it was a close question as to
whether this conversation was part of the crime, appellant
had not been prejudiced enough for a mistrial

(T.43-45).

Later Shaw made the statement that he doubted if he
would still be alive if appellant had known that Shaw was an
informant.

An objection to the statement was made and sustained,

the remark stricken, and the jury admonished to disregard the
answer of the witness

(T.l40).
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The final complaint concerning Kayle Shaw's testimony is that he said that he had fired his attorney because
he believed that she was conspiring with appellant to "set
him up (for assassination) . "

(T. 14 2) .

Appellant's motion

for a mistrial was denied and the trial judge said that he
didn't think the appellant hac been prejudiced and that it
highly unlikely that the jury's verdict would be based on
this one stateDent (T.l46).

ShaH admit ted on cross-examino:

that appellant had never threatened him (T.l53).
Utah case law provides the proper standard for
determining when a motion for a mistrial should be granted.
The standard is established in several recent cases, among
them State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1323
State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 111

(1974~

(1972).

In

f

case unanimous courts affirmed the decisions of the lower c
to deny motions for mistrial.

This Court noted that

ami~

should be granted if the trial judge believes that an errm
been made and that "in light of the total Proceeding there
been such prejudice that the defendant cannot have a fairo
impartial determination of his guilt or innocence." 517

P.:

at 1324.
On review this Court considers these two proposi:
and should reverse only if it appears that (1) error did oc
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and(2) substantial prejudice resulted to the extent that
there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for the error,
there would have been a different result. 502 P.2d

at 114.

In reviewing the facts this Court acknowledges the authority
and advantaged position of the trial judge and will not upset
his ruling unless it clearly appears that he had abused his
discretion. 517 P.2d

at 1324 and 502 P.2d

at 114.

Respondent submits that on review of the record
and in light of analysis below, this Court will find that the
trial court carefully and thoughtfully made his rulings and
he did not abuse his discretion.
The trial court did not actually determine if the
first alleged error was in fact error, rather calling it a
close question, and finding that even if it were error, there
had not been enough prejudice to warrant a mistrial.

Implicit

in this finding is the determination that the verdict of the
jury does not hinge on Shaw's reference to appellant's possession
of Angel Dust.

Respondent further submits that under Rule 55 of

the Utah Rules of Evidence, the inclusion within Shaw's testimony of appellant's statement that he was in possession of
Angle Dust was proper.

While not admissible as proof of guilt

of the crime charged, it is admissible as tending to show intent,

-17-
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plan and lack of mistake. 1
1\c.!ditional support for admission of the statement
comes from State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977).

I·

reversing a lower court conviction on other grounds, the
majority rebuffed appellant's claim that testimony v1as adni:
in violation of Rule 55:
"The testimony concerning the other
allegedly criminal acts [the robbery of
othc•c persons] committed by the defendant
during the course of the cor:ur1ission of
the crime with which he was charged,
were, in fact, eyewitness descriptions
of the events that occurred." 571 P.2d
at 1353.
On this basis a narration of the conversation between appel:
and Shaw as they a\laitcd delivery of the PCP was proper, e•·,
if it included a minor referencP to other drucJs to be .sold,
such a reference not being sufficiently prejudicial to reqc.
exclusion from Shaw's chronological account of the

events~

the meeting.
Regarding the second incident, the sustaining of·
objection to the improper response and the cautionary
tion to the jury cured any potential prejudice.

admo~

As the

~

lRULE 55, OTHER CRIMES OR CIVIL WRONGS.
Subject to Rule;·
evidence that a person committed a crime or civil vnong on
specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his dispositi
to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an infer&
that he committed another crime or civil 1vrong on another
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such~
is admissible when relevant to prove some other material ·
includin<] absence of r;1is take or accident, 1110t i ve, opportti·
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity.
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court remetrked:
"In the absence of something
persuasive to the contrary, we assume
that the jurors were conscientious in
performing to
[sic] their duty, and
that they followed the instructions
of the court." 517 P.2d at 1324.
Respondent submits that because no evidence was offered to
support the claim of prejudice and in deference to the trial
court's authority, this Court should affirm the trial court's
ruling.
In reference to the third allegation, that a mistrial
should have been declared after Shaw's remark about his previous
attorney, respondent urges the Court to sustain the action of
the trial court in denying the motion.

Having found no

prejudice, the trial judge could not grant a mistrial.

The

credibility of a witness is for the jury to determine, and it
is unlikely that jurors would have seriously considered Shaw's
claim that his former attorney, a member in good standing of
the Utah Bar, would have been involved in an assassination plot.
The trial judge stated that he did not believe that the
testimony was

dam~ging

or prejudicial to appellant, the issue

was a collateral one with no bearing on the main issue of
appellant's guilt in distributing a controlled substance for
value, and he did not believe the jurors would give it another
thought

(T.403-404).

Given this inherent incredibility of
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the testimony, there \vas little likelihood that Shaw's remap
would have substantial

im~act

on the jury, as to alter the

verdict, and the motion for mistrial was properly denied.
POI!JT B
THE ALLEGED PROSECUTORH\.L HISCONDUCT IN CLOSING
ARGUMENT >vAS ACTUALLY PROPER REBUTTAL IN AN ANALYSIS OF THE
TOTP..L EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL.
Appellant nade no objections to statements in the
prosecutor's closing argument, and the general rule is that
a failure to raise objections at trial precludes the

consid~

tion of those issues on appeal unless such exceptional circe-'
stances exist thilt a miscarriage of justice would result if
the matter were not considered.

State v. Winger, 26 Utah

~

Appellant cites a

California~~

People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2d 245, 324 P.2d 556

(1958), as prm.

118, 485 P.2d 1398 (1971).

•

ing the exceptions relied upon.

Namely, (l) grave doubts

about defendant's guilt and(2) the inability to obviate or
cure the alleged error.

Respondent contends that evidence

in the instant case was not evenly divided, so as to make
the issue of appellant's guilt a close question.

Appellant

presented no evidence at all while the state produced over-.
whelming evidence of guilt.

Respondent also submits

that~

if error occurred during the argument stage, it was minor,
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i

and the trial judge was fully equipped to obviate any potential
prejudice with appropriate admonishments and further cautionary
instructions.
Counsel for appellant included in his closing
argument a statement (partially Jury Instruction No. 10) which
informed the jury of the appellant's constitutional right not
to testify and that no presumption of guilt should arise from
the exercise of that privilege.

He noted that a defendant may

have several reasons for not testifying - among them his
satisfaction with the evidence presented or his reluctance
to be cross-examined (T.458).
During his argument the prosecutor alluded to
defense counsel's comments:
"He read the instruction about the
defendant not testifying and not creating a presumption against him and he
said the reason why the defendant did
not testify--he said I am a skilled
prosecutor and I would have had a
chance to cross-examine him. No question
about that.
I would suggest that maybe
that is the reason." (T.483)
Mr. Yocum then observed that Kayle Shaw was crossexamined for two and one-half hours by two very skilled
attorneys, yet came through it very successfully, while acknowledging that Shaw had admitted possessing LSD on occasion.
Respondent contends that the prosecutor's remarks
were wholly proper.

They were in harmony with the argument
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guidelines of State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949

(Utah 1975),and

-

State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah l977),and State v. \VhiL
(Utah Case No. 15210, filed 3/13/78),and in accord with the
constitutional mandate that the prosecution must not commen:
on the failure of the defendant to testify.
California, 380

u.s.

609,14 L.Ed 2d 106

See Griffin v.

(1965).

In St.i".te v. Kazda, supra, the prosecutor harJ state
during closing argul'lent,

"The de Fe .,se has presented no evidf

as to \·1hy the defendant v1as out there.
there?"

wnat was he duing ou

As in the instant case, Kazda neither testified nor

called witnesses.

After noting

tha~

a right and a duty to analyze all

trial counsel have botl

~spects

of the evidence,

including what it is or isn't and what it shows and doesn't
show, the court found the prosecutor's comment to be proper.
In State v. Eaton, supra, we find an overzealous
prosecutor who crossed the line between commenting on the tc·
evidence and commenting specifically on the defendant's fail
to testify.

That case also involved a controlled drug buy!

during closing argument the prosecutor stressed the fact th'
only the state's chief witness and the defendant "really knc
[sic] what took place in that house" and then asked "vlhat de
the defendant tell us?"

Later he referred again to the

dant's failure to testify and explain.

The defendant

de~

in~
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received a new trial.
The facts of Eaton are not similar to the instant
case.

Here the prosecutor's emphasis was not on appellant's

failure to testify, where he merely supported defense
counsel's comments, rather it was on the thoroughness and
consistency of Kayle Shaw's testinony.
The most recent Utah case on this issue, State v.
White, supra, makes clear that in appropriate circumstances
the prosecutor may make an observation on a defendant's
silence, as long as the purpose is not to encourage the
jury to draw inferences of guilt from what was not said,
but to see the total picture of the evidence.

In

~fuite,

also

a drug case, the defendant was asked on direct examination
only his name, address, and occupation.

During closing

argument the prosecutor said that because the scope of crossexamination is limited by the direct examination, he could
not ask the defendant about how he came to be in possession
of heroin and cocaine, how much he was being paid for it, etc.
In affirming the conviction, the Court found the remarks
a proper part of the prosecutor's analysis of the evidence
and that the prosecutor merely pointed out what the jury
already knew--that the defendant had purposely limited his
testimony to avoid saying anything about his involvement
or non-involvement.
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When compared with these three fact patterns,
it is abundantly clear that the prosecutor's remarks
in this case were proper and completely within the
guidelines of constitutjonally permissible evidence
analysis.

Even if this Court finds them to be error,

they would be harmless under Hodges,

~,

ctnd Hilchell,

supra.
Appellant also alleges that the trial court
committed further error by allowing Mr. Yocum to read
from a transcript of the tape recording when the transcript
har; earlier been refused admission into evidence.

However,

the prosecutor had personally listened to the tape, which
had been admitted into evidence, and in refreshing his
memory of what was on the tape, he is allowed to use any
writing to jog his memory.

HcCormick on Evidence, 2d Ed.,

1973, Chap. 1, § 9, p. 15.

The transcript accurately

represented what he heard and he was therefore properly
using the transcript for memory refreshing only and so
at T. 487.

sta~

The judge's actual ruling is unclear; he initial

found Hr. Yocum's use of the transcript objectionable, but
after the prosecutor argued present recollection refreshed,
the judge agreed that Hr. Yocum could refer to what was
on the tape (T.487).

Moreover, a prosecutor's closing
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argument is not evidence and the jury in this case was so
advised (T.434).
Respondent rejects appellant's contention that
the jurors probably drew the inference that the transcript
of the tape which was available, probative evidence, had
been kept from them by the court.

The jury heard the

tape during their deliberations and decided for themselves
what the voices were saying, cognizant that Agent Allred
had also listened to it and typed a transcription {T.l91).
Jury Instruction No. 6 clearly charged the jury to consider
only the evidence, both offered and admitted, and the
presumption is that the jury did its duty and followed
its instructions.
Nevertheless, cases cited by appellant do not
support his

clai~.

In Peoole v. Gilmer, 110 Ill.App.2d 73,

249 N.E.2d 129, 133 (1969), the court found the "determining
factor was whether there was a reasonable possibility that
improperly introduced evidence might have contributed to
the conviction."

Respondent contends that it is substantially

unlikely that the refusal of the court to allow the jury to
see a transcript that one narcotics officer had made of a
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tape which the jurors would themselves listen to, combined
with an earlier remark about the prosecutor's crossexamination skills, affected the jury's verdict.

Unless

appellant can show that but for these occurrences, if
deemed error, the jury would likely have returned a not
guilty verdict, the conviction must stand.

Since

appellant has not met the burden of State v. Eaton,
supra, respondent urges the Court to reject appellant's
arguments, no substantial evidence having been
offered to support an acquittal.

-26-
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POINT C
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE HAVING BEEN
CLAIMED FOR VALID REASONS BY BRADLEY RICH, THE TRIAL
COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING TO REQUIRE THE
ATTORNEY TO TESTIFY.
For a period of two months in 1977, Bradley
Rich of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association represented Kayle Shaw, who was facing three charges of
aggravated robbery (T.20,74).
With the jury absent, appellant called Mr.
Rich to testify and after several preliminary questions
asked the witness if he ever had occasion to discuss
Shaw's work as an undercover agent for the State of Utah.
Mr. Rich refused to answer the question on the ground that
a response would require him to divulge a confidence of a
client (T.357).

The attorney's refusal was in complete

accord with Rule 26(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
which provides:
"Subject to Rule 37 and except
as otherwise provided by paragraph 2
of this rule communications found by
the judge to have been between lawyer
and his client in the course of that
relationship and in professional
confidence, are privileged, and a
client has a privilege (a) if he is
the witness to refuse to disclose
any such communication, and (b) to
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prevent his lawyer from disclosing
it, and (c) to prevent any other
witn~ss fro~ disclosing such
communication if it carne to the
knowledge of such witness (i) in
the course of its transmittal
between the client and the lawyer,
or (ii) in a manner not reasonably
to be anticipated by the client,
or (iii) as a result of a breach
of th2 lawyer-clicnl relationship.
The privilege may be claimed by the
client in person nr by his lawyer,
or if inco~petent, by his guardian,
or if deceased by his personal
representative. The privilege
available to a corporation or
association terminates upon
dissolution."
The exceptions to this general rule are detailed
in 26(2) and it is specifically upon 26(2}(a) that appellant
bases his allegation that the privilege was improperly
claimed by Mr. Rich and sustained by the court.
26 (2}

Rule

(a) states:
"Such privileges shall not
extend (a) to a communication if the
judge finds that sufficient evidence,
aside from the communication, has been
introduced to warrant a finding that
the legal service was sought or obtainc=d
in order to enable or aid the client to
commit or plan to commit a crime or
tort."
The record shows that Mr. Rich was hired tn

repr~

sent Shaw on robbery charges and his January lOth appointrn0
occurred weeks before Shaw made ovc=rtures to Detective

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-28-

carlson about the possibility of becoming an agent.

There

is no evidence to suggest that Shaw hired Mr. Rich to aid
him in the commission of a crime, and therefore no excepzion under 26(2) (a) exists, and the witness properly
invoked the attorney-client privilege on behalf of Kayle
Shaw.
Appellant urged the court to require Mr. Rich
to respond in camera, stating that the judge could then
determine for himself whether the communication was
privileged (T.360).

The court refused and deferred to

Mr. Rich's judgment and knowlege of the facts allowing
him to claim the privil, :re if he determined that answering
would violate a confidence (T.363).
No Utah case supports appellant's claim.

A. v.

District Court of Second Judicial District, 550 P.2d 315
(Colo. 1976), is distinguishable.

It concerned the

work product exception in a grand jury proceeding.
People v. Mahan, 1 Utah 205 (1875), is also inapplicable
as that defendant had consulted with the attorney for
the

~ole

purpose of learning the legal effect of signing

another's name to a note.

Noteworthy here is the excerpt

cited by appellant, in which Lord Chief

Baron is quoted

as having said:
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"Where the original ground
of communication is n1alum in se
• . • this can never be included
within • • • professional
confidence." (Emphasis added.)
Once again the focus is on the motive for seeking legal
help, and Kayle Shaw's retention of counsel to represent

him in felony trials is a legitimate motive.
Finally, the Kansas case, State v. Henderson,
205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970), is also

distinguishe~ble

as the defendant was the attorney's client, and the

attor~'

spoke up in an attempt to withdraw as counsel because his
client was uncooperative and insisted on giving perjured
testimony.

It must be noted, however, that the duty owed

to the court by a defendant's attorney is intrinsically

different from the duty owed by the former attorney of a
witness.

That the former may have a higher obligation to

ke2p perjured testimony from being given is no evidence
that the latter has the same responsibility.
Rule 26 allows an attorney to claim the privilege
on behalf of his client and makes no provision for a
separate determination by the court that the matter actual!
is privileged.

The trial court, therefore, properly

allo~

Mr. Rich to claim the privilege and refused to testify
about confidences shared during his professional relationship with Kayle Shaw.
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POINT D
THE GRANTING OF A CONTINUANCE RESTS IN THE
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred
in not granting a continuance over a weekend so
that Carolyn Nichols, Kayle Shaw's former attorney,
could testify.

Appellant wanted to question Ms. Nichols

about Shaw's statement that she and appellant were
planning to have Shaw murdered.

After considerable

argument (T.400-404), the court made the following ruling
in denying appellant's request:
"THE COURT:
I can't see that
that testimony or that evidence is
that damaging or prejudicial to the
defendant, frankly. We spent
considerable time on collateral
matters that didn't even bear on the
main issue of this trial and it seems
to me that that was one of them.
I
don't feel that the Jurors are going
to give any attention to that particular
part of the testimony. They will see if
[sic] for what it was and that was just
simply a conclusion or a statement of
the witness and I think he was more or
less pressured into saying something
on the stand and that just happened to
be it.
I don't feel that--if your
witness was available I would consent
to certainly let you reopen for the
purpose of putting her on the stand
and attempting to elicit her testimony
but I just feel in the interest of -in the interest of time and for an
orderly trial we should proceed until
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conclusion.
I don't think we con
finish today.
In fact, we have
discuHscd it so long now that I
I would
am sure that we can't.
deny the motion to continue it
until Monday which is past the
wP~~cnd and we will proceed in the
m~:rning."
(T.403-404).
State v. Noosman, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah 1975),
announced the stundard of rev1c·:J in <1ctcrmini.ns if thee
refusal to grant a continuance was plejudicial error:
"The granting of a continuance
of a case is a matter resting in the
sound discretion of the trial judge,
and that discretion will not be
interfered with on appeal except
where the court clearly abused its
discretion in the matter."
It is clear from the trial judge's statement that
he found that whole area of testir1ony for which the continua
was sought to be collateral to the r1ain issue, in no way
damaging or prejudicial to appellant, and time consur1ing
and inconvenient to the court.

These findings rebut

appellant's claim that the testimony would have been materii
likely to have affected the jury's verdict, and of little
inconvenience to the court, three factors which he cites
as necessary under a 1976 Alaska decision, Salaz~r v. State,'
P.2d 66

(Alaska 1976).

of murder, was g.

In that case the appellant, convicted

~ntcd

a new trial because the court

fou~

that the expected testimony of an absent police officers
that he could see the victim's car from tho road Hou1d he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-32-

material to appellant's defense, where the state's theory
of the case was that the deceased's car could not be seen
from the road and appellant knew it was there only because
he had committed the killing.
The crucial nature of the denied testimony, so
clearly apparent in Salazar, is not present in the instant
case.

Here, the trial judge reasonably concluded that the

jurors would not take seriously Shaw's allegations of a
death plot.
The trial court made reasonable, proper findings
in his refusal to deny a weekend continuance pursuant to
his authority under Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
which allows the exclusion of admissible evidence, and
therefore did not abuse his discretion.

Respondent urges

the court to reject appellant's claim.
POINT E
AS NO SIGNIFICANT ERRORS OCCURRED IN THE CONDUCT
OF THE TRIAL, THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL, CUMULATIVE EFFECT.
Respondent submits that the trial court conducted
a fair trial for appellant and has offered evidence and case
law in previous sections which demonstrate

that neither

the prosecutor nor the court committed prejudicial error.
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State v. St. Cl<1ir, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2c1 323 (]:
cited as support by appellant is not analogous to the insbm
case.

Paul St. Clair had been convicted of murder and sen-

tenced to death, and the court then, as now, scrupulously
searched the record in death-penalty cases for significant
error, 1vhether raised on appeal or not.

The errors complainel

of in that case were individually significant, though not
prejudicial, and the court declded that signjficant errors
can have a cumulative prejudicial effect.

In the instant

case there were no significant errors.
Appellant has not shown that the outcome would
have been different even if claimed errors had not occurred
and his conviction should therefore be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Because warrantless, electronic monitoring of
an undercover narcoticsagent is allowed by the United
States Supreme Court and authorized by the need to protect
the lives of the agents, and because no prejudicial errors
were committed at trial, respondent urges an affirmation
of the verdict.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRI\IG L. BARLO\v
Assistant Attorney Genccal
Attorneys for Respondent
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